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canaDa leaves uniteD states anD 
neW zealanD BeHinD: pleDges tO 
aDOpt un DeclaRatiOn On RigHts Of 
inDigenOus peOples
After almost 22 years of debate, and 
nearly a quarter century after the forma-
tion of the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations (WGIP), the General 
Assembly of the United Nations adopted 
the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples on September 13, 2007. As the UN 
explains, the Declaration was intended 
to emphasize “the rights of indigenous 
peoples to maintain and strengthen their 
own institutions, cultures and traditions 
and to pursue their development in keep-
ing with their own needs and aspirations.” 
Even though UN declarations are generally 
not legally binding, four Member States 
with sizeable indigenous populations — 
New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the 
United States — initially voted against the 
Declaration. The turbulent relationships 
between these states’ governments and 
indigenous populations provide a possible 
explanation for their decisions not to adopt 
the Declaration, but their votes pitted them 
against 143 other UN Member States that 
voted for the Declaration.
In an apparent reversal of policy, on 
March 3, 2010, the Governor General 
of Canada, Michaëlle Jean, delivered the 
annual “Speech from the Throne” before the 
Canadian parliament and announced that 
Canada would soon adopt the Declaration. 
While the Governor General’s statement is 
not a formal adoption, the “Speech from 
the Throne” is used to “outline the broad 
agenda” of the Canadian government, much 
like the “State of the Union” address given 
by the U.S. President, and can indicate top 
governmental priorities. Once Canada for-
mally adopts the Declaration, it will join 
Australia, which in April 2009 announced 
that it would change its stance on the 
Declaration. Australia’s formal adoption of 
the Declaration has been part of a general 
shift in that country’s policy towards its 
indigenous population, culminating in a 
controversial review of its policy towards 
aboriginal customary law. Both Australia 
and now Canada have taken broad, discrete 
steps towards recognizing fundamental 
rights of indigenous communities.
Canada’s move towards adopting the 
Declaration leaves the United States and 
New Zealand as the only remaining UN 
Member States that still stand against it. 
Both countries have significant indigenous 
populations, to whom the adoption of the 
Declaration would likely be a meaningful 
gesture. While adopting the Declaration is 
only symbolic because it does not include 
any binding provisions, the very lack of 
binding elements makes the United States’ 
and New Zealand’s opposition signifi-
cant — New Zealand cited fundamental 
conflicts with its constitution and laws 
as the primary reasons for opposing the 
Declaration and the United States said that 
the Declaration itself was not clear enough 
to warrant support and that it failed even 
as an aspirational document. Neither of 
these criticisms seems to take into account 
the non-binding nature of the Declaration. 
The Obama administration in the United 
States has deflected criticism about its 
position on the Declaration by saying that 
its position on the issue is “under review.” 
New Zealand Prime Minister John Key 
made a similar statement when asked about 
his government’s position in mid-2009. 
However, with such global consensus on 
the issue of indigenous rights and several 
years of real-life application to dispel con-
cerns that the Declaration could be used in 
unforeseen ways, excuses for delaying the 
adoption of the Declaration are running 
short for both the United States and New 
Zealand.
Repealing “DOn’t ask, DOn’t tell”
In his first State of the Union address 
on January 27, 2010, President Barack 
Obama explicitly stated his plans to end the 
military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT) 
policy on gays and lesbians serving in 
the armed forces: “This year, I will work 
with Congress and our military to finally 
repeal the law that denies gay Americans 
the right to serve the country they love 
because of who they are.” The President 
is not alone in his belief that the policy 
should come to an end. Nearly two out of 
three Americans believe the policy consti-
tutes discrimination and 57 percent believe 
that gays and lesbians should be allowed 
to serve openly in the military, according 
to a February 2010 Quinnipiac University 
poll. Still, the policy has persisted well into 
the President’s term and no concrete action 
has yet been taken while DADT discharges 
continue. In fiscal year 2009 alone, 428 
service members were discharged despite 
continued U.S. involvement in two wars. 
With public opinion supporting the repeal 
of the policy, the continued gap between 
the President’s rhetoric and his actions 
risks squandering the apparent momentum 
toward the abolition of DADT.
There are several different legal ave-
nues available by which to repeal DADT. 
Because the policy was enacted under 
the Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense 
Authorization Act, any actual repeal of 
the law would have to come from either 
Congress or the courts. So far, President 
Obama has advocated against attempts in 
Congress to introduce legislation repealing 
the law or suspending discharges. In June 
2009, the Supreme Court declined to hear 
an appeal challenging the constitutionality 
of the policy, indicating the Court is not 
currently interested in addressing the issue. 
The latest Congressional development 
came when Senator Joe Lieberman (I-CT) 
introduced a bill to repeal DADT, but 
sources have suggested that the President 
supports including the measure in the 2011 
appropriations bill for the Department of 
Defense, at the earliest. The President con-
tinues to decline to take immediate action, 
though the recent DADT modification by 
Defense Secretary Gates, making it more 
difficult to discharge under the policy, is a 
step in the right direction.
While economic and health care issues 
have been at the forefront of political 
debate during President Obama’s first year 
in office, all other issues need not be 
ignored. Concerns about momentum, in 
addition to the continued loss of valu-
able military time, resources, and per-
sonnel to a discriminatory policy, only 
strengthen the case for immediate action. 
If President Obama is committed to repeal-
ing DADT, he should use his own power 
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as commander-in-chief to strengthen the 
military by halting discharges under the 
policy and he should not stand in the 
way of Congress’s efforts to take action. 
Using U.S. involvement in two war zones 
as justification to continue to discharge 
soldiers willing to fight for their country 
is arguably not the best way to support the 
U.S. military. In fact, many scholars have 
argued quite the opposite.
a step fORWaRD fOR immigRants’ 
RigHts in tHe uniteD states?
Until March 31, 2010, Jose Padilla 
awaited deportation from the United 
States, where he has lived for forty years. 
A Vietnam veteran and a commercial 
truck driver, Padilla was convicted in 
2001 of possession and transportation of 
marijuana, which made his deportation 
mandatory under the current immigra-
tion laws. However, on March 31, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held in Padilla v. 
Kentucky that Padilla had received inef-
fective assistance of counsel because his 
criminal defense attorney failed to inform 
him that he could be deported if found 
guilty of the drug charges. In so holding, 
the Supreme Court has fortified the barrier 
against attorneys’ failure to advise their 
clients of the consequences of pleading 
guilty, first established by Strickland v. 
Washington. Padilla explicitly recognizes 
that Strickland protects non-citizens facing 
the possibility of deportation, if convicted. 
Padilla is a much-needed check on the 
ongoing attempts to narrow constitutional 
protections afforded to non-citizens.
In the context of cases like Padilla’s, 
the enforcement arm of the U.S. immigra-
tion system, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), has stated that its goal 
is to “identify and remove criminal aliens 
from the United States” with an emphasis 
on violent or “Level 1” offenders who are 
considered “dangerous criminal aliens.” 
However, isolating “dangerous criminal 
aliens” solely by classes of crimes, espe-
cially individual, non-violent narcotics 
crimes, is unlikely to achieve this goal. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged 
in Padilla that immigration policy has 
shifted from discretion to dogma, result-
ing in questionable deportations. The rul-
ing takes a step towards restoring some 
“discretionary authority” for judges by 
allowing them to determine if non-citizens 
have been apprised of the possibility, or in 
some cases, probability of deportation as a 
result of pleading guilty to a crime. As the 
Court concluded, deportation must be con-
sidered a direct consequence of conviction 
— rather than merely “collateral” — of 
which attorneys have an affirmative duty 
to inform their clients.
While the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Padilla does offer some protection for 
non-citizens with respect to adequacy of 
legal counsel in criminal proceedings, it 
does nothing to alter immigration laws in 
the United States. Padilla still faces pos-
sible deportation because, on remand, he 
may still be convicted of the crimes to 
which he originally pleaded guilty. His 
deportation is likely inevitable under cur-
rent immigration law, given the thousand 
pounds of marijuana that he was caught 
trying to transport. Others, however, like 
Jerry Lemaine, who faces deportation after 
being caught with one marijuana cigarette 
even though he has been a legal non-
citizen resident since he left Haiti at age 
three, could benefit from increased judicial 
discretionary authority in deportation pro-
ceedings. Lemaine’s case, which is before 
the Supreme Court now and was argued on 
the same day that the Padilla decision was 
issued, has the potential to protect legal-
ized non-citizens from deportation if they 
are convicted of more than one minor drug 
offense (such as possession of small quan-
tities of marijuana). This is not to say that 
non-citizens should always be protected 
from deportation due to drug charges. As 
Justice Stevens noted in Padilla, the major 
change in immigration law over the past 
ninety years, and the likely source of much 
injustice, is the lack of discretionary power 
on the part of judges — both immigration 
and criminal. This is the policy that begs 
review.
Evan Wilson, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers North America for the 
Human Rights Brief.
latiN america
BRazilian militaRy ReJects lula’s 
tRutH cOmmissiOn
Hours after President Luiz Inácio 
(“Lula”) da Silva of Brazil announced 
plans in December 2009 to set up a truth 
commission that would investigate crimes 
committed during the military dictator-
ships, Brazil’s top military officials threat-
ened their resignations if Lula did not 
retract the proposal. Lula, however, told 
the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva 
in early March 2010 that the country 
had created a National Truth Commission. 
Military officials are concerned about 
opening military archives to the commis-
sion because hundreds of Brazilians are 
alleged to have been tortured, kidnapped, 
disappeared, and murdered by the military 
government between 1964 and 1985. To 
assuage his officials’ concerns, Lula has 
set up a working group of representatives 
from the justice department, homeland 
affairs, the human rights department, the 
military, and civil society. The group will 
have to agree on the workings of the truth 
commission, as Lula promised that the 
commission will not judge people, but will 
seek to understand the truth of what hap-
pened from 1964 to 1985.
The Brazilian government has been 
hesitant to create a truth commission 
because of its 1979 law providing amnesty 
to military and political officials who com-
mitted political or electoral crimes from 
1961 to 1979. The amnesty law, however, 
may violate the American Convention of 
Human Rights (ACHR), which Brazil rati-
fied in 1979, because it prevents judicial 
proceedings for and investigations of seri-
ous violations of non-derogable human 
rights such as the right to life. In 2001, the 
Inter-American Court on Human Rights 
(IACtHR), a body whose jurisdiction Brazil 
recognized when it ratified the ACHR, held 
that Peru’s failure to investigate and punish 
crimes relating to the military’s massacre 
of alleged Sendero Luminoso members 
violated the Convention. The Peruvian gov-
ernment refused to investigate the crime 
because of its law providing amnesty to 
police and military officials who commit-
ted crimes during the period from 1980 
to 1995. In Barrios Altos v. Peru, the 
IACtHR found that the Peruvian amnesty 
law violated the government’s duties under 
international human rights law, and held 
that “all amnesty provisions . . . for serious 
human rights violations such as torture, 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execu-
tion and forced disappearance, [are] pro-
hibited because they violate non-derogable 
rights recognized by international human 
rights law.”
Because the Brazilian amnesty law has 
been interpreted to protect people who 
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have committed torture, and because free-
dom from torture is a non-derogable right 
under the ACHR, the law is incompatible 
with the Court’s decision under Barrios 
Altos. Brazil’s amnesty law should there-
fore be repealed and should not bar the 
creation of a truth commission.
Truth commissions are meant to be 
non-judicial investigations into past peri-
ods of violence during which human rights 
violations were systematically committed. 
They are part of a process to end impunity 
for serious rights violations and can lead 
to justice and reparations for victims and 
their families. Some truth commissions are 
granted subpoena power from the legisla-
ture, while others rely specifically on vol-
untary participation. It is unclear what type 
of powers the Brazilian truth commission 
would have, but it would certainly need 
access to military archives and testimony 
to have a clear picture of what transpired. 
But since the 1979 law provides amnesty 
for political crimes and politically moti-
vated crimes, the commission might have 
difficulty accessing information.
By assisting in the investigation of 
crimes, truth commissions help uphold 
citizens’ right to know about the past. The 
IACtHR’s decision in Barrios Altos recog-
nized and protected the right to know by 
declaring the non-investigation of abuses 
a violation of the ACHR. Despite Brazil’s 
national laws, it too has the obligation to 
end the impunity for crimes committed 
during the dictatorships and ensure its citi-
zens know about past crimes. Brazil cannot 
use its amnesty law as an excuse not to cre-
ate a truth commission.
Most of Brazil’s neighbors with similar 
histories have gone beyond the creation of 
truth commissions and have begun pros-
ecuting individuals who committed serious 
violations of international human rights 
law. Although a small group of six repre-
sentatives is currently discussing how the 
Brazilian truth commission will function, 
it is important for victims to participate 
in the process to ensure the commission 
addresses their needs. Furthermore, the 
government should create a truth com-
mission through the legislature to ensure 
that the commission has the appropriate 
authority and funding to investigate crimes 
and preserve evidence for later prosecu-
tion. Given the evolution of international 
law over the past ten years, Brazil can no 
longer hide behind its amnesty law as an 
excuse for perpetuating the state of impu-
nity. It must follow its neighbors in creat-
ing a truth commission that will investigate 
past human rights abuses and eventually 
prosecute those responsible for serious 
violations of international law.
anti-teRRORism case against 
cHiQuita mOves aHeaD
A suit against Chiquita Brands 
International filed by families of Americans 
kidnapped and killed by the FARC guer-
rilla force of Colombia will continue in 
federal courts after U.S. Judge Kenneth 
Marra of the Southern District of Florida 
rejected Chiquita’s motion to dismiss on 
February 4, 2010. The plaintiffs are family 
members of five men who worked as mis-
sionaries in Panama across the border from 
Colombia in the 1990s. FARC kidnapped 
the men separately, demanded ransom, and 
then killed them. The plaintiffs are most 
likely suing Chiquita in U.S. court, rather 
than filing suit against FARC in either U.S. 
or Colombian courts because Chiquita is 
a large, identifiable corporation with high 
profits, whereas it would be difficult to 
find the members of FARC who commit-
ted the crimes and prosecute them in any 
forum. Therefore, the plaintiffs are likely to 
have more success at recovering damages 
against Chiquita than against individual 
members of FARC.
The U.S. Secretary of State declared 
FARC, a group that controls vast areas of 
Colombia, a foreign terrorist organization 
in 1997 because of its violent acts, kidnap-
pings, and bombings. Plaintiffs allege that 
Chiquita gave FARC money, which sup-
ported the organization’s violent actions 
and resulted in their family members’ 
death. Chiquita, however, claims it was 
forced to pay the guerrillas in order to 
work in remote areas of the country. Judge 
Marra’s decision to allow the suit to pro-
ceed sends a message to U.S. corpora-
tions that they may face liability if they 
finance international terrorist organiza-
tions. Plaintiffs’ attorney Greg Hansel told 
the Human Rights Brief that “the families 
intend to hold Chiquita accountable for 
supporting Colombian terrorists to make a 
buck selling bananas.”
The case was filed under the Anti-
Terrorism Act of 1991(18 U.S.C. § 2331), 
a statute allowing U.S. citizens and their 
heirs to sue for injuries resulting from acts 
of international terrorism. Although the 
statute broadly states that a plaintiff may 
sue for “an act of international terrorism” 
without specifying who the plaintiffs may 
sue, the Chiquita case stands with other 
case law to include organizations support-
ing terrorist groups as possible defendants. 
Under the plaintiffs’ theory of recovery, 
Chiquita violated the Anti-Terrorism Act 
when it aided and abetted FARC’s terrorist 
activities by providing the guerrillas with 
money. Chiquita’s motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted asserted that mere payments 
to FARC are not covered by the statute 
because they did not constitute violent acts 
dangerous to human life so as to meet the 
statute’s partial definition of “acts of inter-
national terrorism.”
While Chiquita’s payments to FARC 
by themselves may not have been acts of 
international terrorism, the court noted that 
under the Anti-Terrorism Act, the plaintiffs 
did not need to show that Chiquita com-
mitted acts of terrorism in order to hold 
Chiquita liable. The plaintiffs simply had 
to be injured by acts of international ter-
rorism, which they were. Furthermore, 
the court found that plaintiffs provided 
sufficient evidence that Chiquita provided 
resources for FARC, which subsequently 
killed the missionaries.
Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA), the 
co-sponsor of the bill that became the Anti-
Terrorism Act, said that the Act sought to 
ensure that “American victims [of terror-
ism would] be able to bring a claim against 
a terrorist group for money damages.” 
Judge Marra noted, however, that the case 
law construing the statute shows that the 
Anti-Terrorist Act also extends secondary 
liability to aiders and abettors who provide 
money to international terrorist groups.
According to the U.S. Department 
of Justice, in 2007 Chiquita admitted to 
paying another Colombian group consid-
ered a terrorist organization. The com-
pany paid Colombian paramilitary group, 
the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia 
(AUC), from about 1997 to 2004, even 
after Chiquita knew that the U.S. govern-
ment considered them a foreign terrorist 
organization. In that case, Chiquita entered 
a plea agreement with the U.S. govern-
ment in which it paid U.S. $25 million and 
admitted to paying an international terror-
ist group while hiding the information in 
its records.
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That Chiquita admitted to paying the 
AUC leads to a reasonable inference that 
the company was also paying FARC. As 
such, Judge Marra agreed that there was 
sufficient evidence to prove that Chiquita 
knew that FARC was a foreign terrorist 
organization, but nevertheless continued 
supporting the group.
The lawsuit has sparked two similar 
suits against Chiquita: one brought under 
the Alien Torts Statute by hundreds of 
Colombians whose family members were 
killed by FARC and another suit by share-
holders of Chiquita against the corpora-
tion. The Alien Torts Statute grants juris-
diction to U.S. federal courts to hear civil 
cases brought by non-U.S. citizens. The 
Colombian plaintiffs’ case follows similar 
reasoning as the cause brought by the mis-
sionaries’ family members: that Chiquita’s 
payments to FARC helped the group con-
tinue its acts of violence, resulting in their 
family members deaths. Both the case 
brought by the Colombians and the one 
brought by shareholders are pending in 
federal courts, and the case under the Anti-
Terrorism Act is the first case to reach a 
judgment thus far.
Tracey Begley, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers Latin America for the 
Human Rights Brief.
suB-saharaN africa
BuRunDians ResORt tO mOB viOlence 
tO aDDRess cRime
On March 26, 2010, Human Rights 
Watch and the Association for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Detained 
Persons reported that many Burundian citi-
zens do not trust in the state police force 
and have instead resorted to vigilantism 
and mob violence to respond to crimes. 
In 2008, at least 88 people were killed or 
injured by mobs. In 2009, at least 74 sus-
pected criminals were killed and 59 were 
injured by civilian mobs, without repercus-
sions by the police and sometimes with 
their explicit consent or encouragement.
In one of the poorest nations in the 
world that has only recently emerged from 
civil war, the position of frustrated mobs is 
understandable. Citizens have commented 
that when they rely on the police, suspected 
criminals are freed a few days after arrest. 
Moreover, considering that as of February 
2010 no one in Burundi has been convicted 
for participating in a mob, people have few 
disincentives from resorting to mob justice.
However, the position of thieves is also 
sympathetic. In August 2009, a 54-year-
old HIV-positive man who was unable to 
work stole bananas from a neighbor’s field. 
When discovered, the man was caught by a 
mob, covered in dry grass, and burned to 
death. While mobs are desperate because 
thieves who steal their valuable property 
go unpunished by official forces, such 
extreme violence against equally sympa-
thetic people is excessive and unjust.
Not even law enforcement is protected 
from the anger and frustration of mobs, due 
in part to the violent past of some members 
of the force, the tendency for police to be 
involved in criminal activity, and their per-
ceived impunity. Since 2005, when many 
former civil war rebels were integrated into 
the police force, 100 policemen have been 
imprisoned for violent offenses. While the 
violence in the police force is disturbing, 
the imprisonment of at least some officers 
demonstrates that there is not complete 
impunity. However, many villagers have 
a different perception. In the province of 
Ruyigi, two policemen were stoned to 
death by a mob after they went into a vil-
lage with weapons and two grenades in 
order to steal. In February 2008, six armed 
policemen were attacked and beaten when 
they entered a local village. Because of 
rising crime, the crowd assumed the men 
were robbers, and two of the officers were 
beaten to death.
In March 2006, the United Nations 
released an interim report on the human 
rights situation in Burundi that concluded 
that Burundi was not meeting its Arusha 
Peace and Reconciliation Agreement obli-
gations to reform its justice system and 
provide trained law enforcement with 
proper equipment. Also, Articles 14 and 
15 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which 
Burundi is a signatory, require all people 
to be informed of charges against them 
and have those charges investigated. By 
allowing mobs to respond to crimes, the 
government is undermining the rule of 
law and permitting repeated violations of 
the Burundi Code of Criminal Procedure, 
which requires all crimes to be openly 
investigated by the police. While Burundi’s 
poverty and transition from civil war have 
made it difficult for the government to cre-
ate an effective law enforcement system, 
it is unacceptable for public officials to 
quietly allow civilian mobs to respond to 
criminal activity, denying suspects access 
to the legal system and denying them due 
process or the rule of law.
WOmen in sWazilanD still Have 
limiteD pROpeRty RigHts
The High Court in Swaziland ruled 
on February 23, 2010 that some married 
women will be allowed to own property 
in their own names for the first time. 
This decision comes five years after the 
adoption of Swaziland’s 2005 constitu-
tion, which guarantees women equal rights 
and protections under Sections 20 and 28, 
and declares any contrary laws void under 
Section 2. Yet since 2005, the legislature 
has not amended or repealed any laws to 
meet this requirement.
In 2009, female attorney and women’s 
rights advocate Doo Aphane filed a law-
suit in the High Court, challenging Section 
16(3) of the Deeds Registry Act as contrary 
to the Constitution. The law treats women 
as minors and prohibits them from register-
ing property. This allows men to buy or sell 
property without consulting their wives, 
but prevents women from doing the same 
without their husbands’ consent.
This law’s discriminatory impact is 
exacerbated if a woman chooses to leave 
her husband. One Swazi woman paid for 
property solely with her earnings, but reg-
istered it in her husband’s name. Ten years 
later, her husband chased her away from 
her home and brought a mistress to live on 
the property. Under Swazi law, the woman 
had no right to the property, despite having 
paid for it in full. Swaziland also has the 
highest HIV/AIDS rate in the world, lead-
ing to greater numbers of younger widows. 
Because a woman cannot own property, 
Swazi law transfers the land back to the 
husband’s family upon his death, leaving 
many widows with no legal protections.
The February 2010 judgment that some 
married women can register property will 
affect between twenty and thirty percent 
of marriages, because it applies only to 
civil ceremony marriages and most Swazi 
people are married under customary law. 
However, Aphane is hopeful that the ruling 
will educate people about women’s rights 
and encourage further reforms. Ideally, the 
legislature would enact sweeping reforms 
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to adhere to the Constitution, since chal-
lenging laws in the courts is slow and 
expensive for litigants.
Beyond being bound by its Constitution, 
Swaziland is subject to Articles 3 and 14 of 
the Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, which guarantee all people rights 
to equal protection and to own property. 
Articles 6 and 15 of the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, to which Swaziland is 
a signatory, give women equal rights to 
enter into contracts and own property and 
require all states to eliminate any discrimi-
natory laws. The recent judgment was a 
small step towards giving women equal 
protection, but the legislature must take 
more proactive steps to prevent continued 
discrimination against women.
Human RigHts gROup cHallenges 
uganDa’s pOlygamy laWs
The women’s rights organization 
MIFUMI filed a petition at the Ugandan 
Constitutional Court on January 28, 2010, 
asking the court to outlaw polygamy. 
MIFUMI claims that polygamy violates 
equality between men and women and 
leads to violence, abandonment, neglect, 
and an increased risk of HIV and AIDS. 
The Ugandan Attorney General filed a 
response to the petition, arguing that polyg-
amy is protected under Article 37 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 
which guarantees the right to culture, tradi-
tion, and religion.
Current polygamy laws in Uganda apply 
to people differently because Uganda rec-
ognizes four types of marriage: customary, 
church and civil, Muslim, and Hindu. Section 
12 of the Customary Marriages Registration 
Act and Section 2 of the Mohammedans 
Act validate polygamy. In contrast, Section 
42 of the Marriage Act states that a person 
who knowingly enters into a marriage with 
someone who is already married commits 
an offense punishable with a maximum 
five-year prison sentence.
MIFUMI contends that polygamy 
is the most significant factor perpetu-
ating violence against women and chil-
dren. Patriarchal hierarchy in polygamous 
unions creates familial unrest, which leads 
to violence when men attempt to domi-
nate and control their wives. Additionally, 
if husbands divide property and assets 
unequally, it leads to intense competition 
between wives. For example, on February 
18, 2010, one woman stabbed and killed 
her fellow wife in a domestic dispute over 
fetching water.
The Domestic Relations Bill Coalition 
(DRBC) is a group of over forty women’s 
and human rights organizations that has 
advocated for a uniform domestic relations 
law that conforms to the constitutional 
right to gender equality. In a 2003 report, 
DRBC noted that children often suffer 
from neglect in polygamous families. Since 
each wife often has her own house and the 
husband rotates to each house, many chil-
dren do not receive regular attention from 
their fathers and are not able to live with 
them. This violates Article 34(1) of the 
Constitution, which gives children the right 
“to know and be cared for by” their fathers, 
and the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child, which stipulates the 
child’s right to reside with her father and 
not to be separated from him against the 
child’s will.
Further, MIFUMI argues that polygamy 
contributes to the spread of HIV/AIDS, 
violating constitutional health protections. 
Each time a man marries, all his wives are 
exposed to an increased risk of contracting 
HIV. Additionally, men sometimes inherit 
widows from other men or a relative who 
died from AIDS, making the spread of 
infection even more likely.
In response to allegations that polyg-
amy violates Sections 33(4) and (6) of 
the Constitution, which prohibit any laws, 
traditions, or customs that violate women’s 
rights, the Attorney General claims that 
polygamy is protected by Section 27 of the 
Constitution, which guarantees a person’s 
right to culture. Since women can choose 
what type of marriage to enter, he argues 
that the current legal system protects the 
right to culture and religion, while respect-
ing a woman’s right to elect the type of 
marriage she wishes.
MIFUMI claims that the Attorney 
General’s position is unfounded. While cul-
ture is important, it cannot be used to oppress 
women or deny them equality. Additionally, 
polygamy violates equal protection because 
women cannot marry more than one man. 
Because Section 33 of the Constitution says 
that customs that violate equal protection 
are illegal, the Constitutional Court should 
take advantage of the opportunity to clarify 
the nation’s laws and to declare polygamy 
unconstitutional.
Caitlin Shay, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers sub-Saharan Africa for the 
Human Rights Brief.
middle east aNd North africa
sauDi WOmen laWyeRs fRee tO 
pRactice laW
Thirty years after earning her law degree, 
Fatma Kabil, Saudi Arabia’s first qualified 
female lawyer, may finally get the chance 
to argue in a courtroom. On February 20, 
2010, Justice Minister of Saudi Arabia 
Mohammad al-Issa announced that Saudi 
Arabia would soon issue a new draft law, 
confirming rumors circulating since last 
fall that the government may reform its 
laws relating to female lawyers. The law, 
which will come into force once the Justice 
Minister sets specific guidelines, would 
permit Saudi women lawyers to set up their 
own legal practices and represent their cli-
ents in court on cases relating to familial 
relations .
The Justice Minister’s announcement is 
widely heralded as progressive in a country 
that is well known for harshly restricting 
women’s rights. Saudi Arabia has yet to 
comply with recommendations to end its 
male guardianship system from the UN 
Human Rights Council in 2009. The sys-
tem treats women as minors and forbids 
women from undertaking basic activities 
like studying, traveling, marrying, access-
ing health care, or filing a court case with-
out first obtaining permission from a male 
guardian.
In this environment, the Justice 
Minister’s announcement came as a shock 
to many. While women are currently per-
mitted to obtain a law degree and work in 
segregated offices, this right is curtailed 
by their inability to represent their clients 
in courts or to open their own practices. 
Under the new draft law, if and when it 
comes into force, women will be able to 
bring family law-related cases to court. 
As a result, women will be able to secure 
more jobs, and female clients may be more 
likely to bring sensitive cases when they 
have access to a trusted female attorney. 
Since this can all be accomplished with-
out violating Islamic Sharia law, which is 
strictly observed and integrated into the 
official governmental law in Saudi Arabia, 
the decision has garnered support from 
both social activists and Saudi government 
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officials. Social activists hope that the draft 
law will pave the way for more reforms that 
would grant Saudi women more rights.
However, in the midst of high expecta-
tions for positive reforms, a recent case 
sentencing a woman to 300 lashes serves as 
a bitter reminder of the reality for women 
in Saudi Arabia. In January 2010, Sawsan 
Salim was charged with “making spurious 
complaints against government officials” 
and “visiting government offices without a 
male guardian” when she filed a complaint 
claiming that a judge had sexually harassed 
her. While the new draft law should be 
lauded by the international community and 
human rights activists world-wide, Saudi 
Arabia still has to undergo substantial 
institutional changes before women will be 
equal members of society.
algeRian civil sOciety DemanDs 
accOuntaBility fOR systematic 
DisappeaRances
Families of the disappeared in Jijel, 
Algeria are calling on the Working 
Group on Enforced and Involuntary 
Disappearances (WGEID) to address the 
nearly 300 disappearances between 1994 
and 1997 and to provide some means of 
reconciliation. Abductions and subsequent 
disappearances of civilians, especially 
supporters of the Islamic Salvation Front 
(FIS), were very common during that time. 
Groups like the Mich’al Association for 
the Missing Children of Jijel, Association 
of the Families of Disappeared of Jijel 
(AFDJ), and the Algerian League for the 
Defense of Human Rights assert that the 
Algerian government was responsible for 
this program of systematic disappearances 
and executions.
The FIS, which was banned in 1992, 
was a key actor in Algeria’s descent into 
civil war from 1991 to 2002. Characterized 
by its free-market and Islamic agendas, 
the party quickly gained popularity. After 
the FIS won 55 percent of the vote in 
Algeria’s first round of elections in 1990, 
the government responded quickly and 
redrew district lines to prevent FIS from 
winning the second round of elections. 
FIS’s protests of gerrymandering triggered 
a shockingly violent eleven-year civil war. 
During this time, there were many disap-
pearances in the Jijel governorate, near the 
Benni Khettab mountains where the FIS’s 
Islamic Salvation Army was based, alleg-
edly conducted by secret service operations 
and militias the government dispatched to 
quell opposition.
Victims and families of the disappeared 
have been unable to solicit substantive 
assistance from the domestic government 
or the international community and the 
Algerian government has yet to reply to 
calls for investigation. Although Algeria 
signed the International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearances, it has yet to ratify the 
instrument. Article 24 of the Convention 
requires States Parties provide reparations 
to victims of disappearances and any indi-
vidual who has suffered harm as a direct 
result of disappearances. Moreover, while 
Algeria it not a party to the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, it dem-
onstrates a consensus in the international 
community as to the gravity of forced 
disappearances, which are listed as a crime 
against humanity under Article 7.
After exhausting efforts to compel a 
governmental response, Algerian human 
rights NGOs turned to the United Nations. 
The AFDJ, which has been reporting the 
Jijel disappearances to the WGEID for 
years, made its latest appeal together with 
Mich’al Association, reporting 104 addi-
tional cases on December 31, 2009. Despite 
their efforts, these NGOs still have not 
received any response from the WGEID.
The story of the Jijel governorate is 
indicative of a problem that plagues most 
Algerians. In 2007, the International Center 
for Transitional Justice went Algiers to par-
ticipate in a national conference on creating 
a truth commission in Algeria, but Algerian 
authorities prevented the meeting from tak-
ing place. Though the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights could provide 
an appropriate venue for victims to express 
their grievances, it did not respond to com-
plaints brought by the Collective of Families 
of the Disappeared in Algeria in 2007.
Some Algerians have received monetary 
compensation through the Algerian Charter 
for Peace and National Reconciliation, 
but victims say that it is not enough and 
demand to be told what happened to their 
loved ones. Moreover, the Charter granted 
amnesty to individuals who fought in the 
National Popular Army, security forces, 
and state sponsored groups — individuals 
against whom families of the disappeared 
will want to seek action when give the 
opportunity. In order to ensure a stable, 
democratic future, the government and the 
international community need to ensure 
that the perpetrators of these grave human 
rights violations are held accountable to 
ensure justice for the families of the disap-
peared and broader societal reconciliation.
suDanese electiOns: On tHe ROaD 
tO inDepenDence OR tO HumanitaRian 
cRisis?
On April 11, Sudanese went to the polls 
for the first time in more than twenty years 
in a highly anticipated election. The activ-
ity leading up to the vote has been arguably 
more controversial than the election itself. 
In early April, Yasir Arman, the presi-
dential candidate for the Sudan Peoples’ 
Liberation Movement (SPLM), announced 
his intention to boycott the presidential 
elections, protesting against alleged fraud 
and instability undermining the elections. 
The SPLM, which is rooted in Southern 
Sudan and is the country’s main opposi-
tion party, still ran candidates in the par-
liamentary and municipal elections in the 
south and in two northern states. Following 
Arman’s lead, Sudan’s other main opposi-
tion parties also withdrew, leaving only 
smaller party candidates to contest the 
National Congress Party (NCP) candidate, 
President Omar Hassan al-Bashir.
While some observers warned that the 
candidates’ would foster a violent politi-
cal environment, experts speculated that 
the implications of the withdrawal were 
not as far-reaching as they may have first 
appeared. Rather, the SPLM and resi-
dents of Southern Sudan may have under-
stood the elections to be a formality and, 
instead, remained invested in the 2011 
referendum on independence. Still, the 
elections carried high stakes. Some argued 
that a boycott of the national elections 
could be a breach of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement, executed between the 
SPLM and the Government of Sudan in 
2005, jeopardizing the 2011 referendum 
for Southern Sudanese independence. 
The elections are pivotal in determining 
whether Southern Sudan will attain inde-
pendence in 2011, and the severity of the 
accompanying political climate.
With the SPLM vigorously vying for 
independence, the partitioning of Sudan 
may very well be inevitable. Regardless of 
the outcome, the international community 
will need to prepare itself for an escalating 
humanitarian crisis in Southern Sudan and 
the country as a whole. Although President 
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Bashir has been scaling back his criti-
cism against independence, there remains 
a strong possibility that the NCP will try 
to delay the independence referendum. 
The south contains two-thirds of Sudan’s 
oil reserves, with which the government of 
Sudan is not likely to part without a fight. 
As the current government has already 
overseen genocide in Darfur, their potential 
for violent repression is not to be underes-
timated.
The international community will have 
to be just as prepared, if not more so, if 
Southern Sudan votes for independence in 
2011. As representatives from Khartoum 
have inflicted violence upon Southern 
Sudan, so too has the SPLM. Southern 
Sudan is rife with corruption, exploita-
tion, disappearances, rape, kidnapping, and 
murder, often at the hands of the SPLM. 
In the event of southern independence, the 
governing authority’s practices will need to 
be monitored to ensure respect for the indi-
vidual and collective rights of the people of 
Southern Sudan. Further, the international 
community may need to assist the southern 
government with capacity building to help 
it cope with health, food, and governance 
issues.
Operating under the responsibility 
to protect principle, current humanitar-
ian efforts in Sudan have been sharply 
criticized for implementing oversimpli-
fied Western ideals without considering 
the political and social realities in Sudan. 
These efforts have been deemed unpre-
pared, focusing their efforts on the day-
to-day, rather than on the possibility of an 
impending humanitarian crisis. Whatever 
the criticisms, it is vital that the inter-
national community prepare, whether by 
adjusting or by broadening its practices, for 
the instability and humanitarian repercus-
sions that will likely follow the elections.
Shubra Ohri, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers the Middle East and North 
Africa for the Human Rights Brief.
europe
alBania’s neW anti-DiscRiminatiOn 
laW pROtects lgBt RigHts
Human Rights advocacy groups world-
wide hailed Albania’s inclusive anti-dis-
crimination law as a victory for equal 
protection from all forms of discrimina-
tion, including discrimination based on 
sexual orientation and gender identity. A 
unanimous Legislative Assembly passed 
and Prime Minister Sali Berisha signed 
off on the broad anti-discrimination bill 
on February 4, 2010. The law, which took 
effect in March, expressly protects lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) 
Albanians, but also extends protection on 
the grounds of disability, race, ethnicity, 
and religion. If properly enforced, the 
anti-discrimination law will be the most 
progressive in the region, since it bans 
discrimination not only in employment, but 
also in other areas of life.
Human Rights Watch (HRW) played a 
vital role in bringing this law to fruition 
through over a year of campaigning on the 
issue. In February 2009, HRW organized 
a roundtable discussion in Tirana with the 
participation of ten Albanian human rights 
organizations, including Aleanca Kunder 
Diskriminimit LGBT (Alliance against 
LGBT Discrimination), to discuss anti-
discrimination protections. These ten orga-
nizations prepared and submitted the first 
draft of the bill to the Albanian government 
for discussion.
This law comes in response to high lev-
els of homophobia documented in Albania 
and the previous absence of legal pro-
tections for LGBT communities. While 
human rights groups hail the bill as a 
major victory, there are concerns that reli-
gious groups will try to slow down its 
adoption into civil society. Few modern 
Albanians are actively religious; however, 
three strong religions continue to dominate 
the country’s value system: Catholicism, 
Orthodox Christianity, and Islam. Due to 
lobbying by these religious groups, a same 
sex marriage-equality provision, included 
in the proposed draft of the bill, was omit-
ted from the text of the final law.
LGBT communities are frequently sub-
jected to intolerance, physical and psy-
chological violence, and police mistreat-
ment. Thus, human rights groups actively 
encourage the Office of the Commissioner 
for the Protection of Equality and the 
Ministry of Labor to implement an ade-
quate enforcement mechanism, with the 
staff and expertise needed to fight discrim-
ination and ensure that homosexuality and 
gender identity are no longer taboo.
Some view this law as an attempt by 
the Albanian government to fulfill part 
of the human rights requirements placed 
on it as a candidate for ascension to the 
EU. EU membership requires all country-
candidates to adopt comprehensive anti-
discrimination legislation in accordance 
with the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which prohibits discrimination 
against LGBT persons. Albania’s initiative 
in civil rights provides a strong example for 
other EU-membership candidates, such as 
Macedonia, which recently removed sexual 
orientation from one of the banned grounds 
for discrimination in an anti-discrimination 
bill. Although homophobia remains preva-
lent in Albanian society and discrimination 
based on sexual orientation is widespread 
in the Balkans, this law is the first step to 
building a more open society founded on 
equal protection for all, and gives human 
rights activists a strong legal platform to 
battle discrimination.
iRelanD’s anti-aBORtiOn laW cOmes 
unDeR cRiticism
The Republic of Ireland, a deeply 
Catholic country, is the only remaining 
Member State of the European Union that 
allows abortions only where there is a 
substantial risk to the life of the mother. 
In 1983, Ireland amended its constitution 
to include a “Pro-Life Amendment,” which 
asserts that the unborn child has an explicit 
right to life from the moment of concep-
tion. As a result, under the current law, it is 
illegal to have an abortion in Ireland even if 
the woman’s health is at risk, the pregnancy 
is the result of rape or incest, the fetus 
would not survive outside of the womb, or 
the continuation of the pregnancy would 
not be in the best interest of the mother. In 
contrast, 44 of the 47 Council of Europe 
Member States allow abortions in the 
majority of these circumstances, especially 
to save the mother’s life or where the preg-
nancy is the result of incest or rape.
In many cases, Irish women seeking 
abortions travel to other European countries 
to have the procedure. From 1980 to 2008, 
137,618 Irish women traveled to the UK to 
have an abortion. However, the Republic 
of Ireland has started to use injunctions 
to prevent women from traveling abroad 
for abortions. According to Human Rights 
Watch, a seventeen-year-old girl in the cus-
tody of a Health Services Executive had to 
get court permission to travel to the UK for 
an abortion. The government also places 
restrictions on when and how organizations 
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can provide information regarding access 
to abortion services abroad. Moreover, 
due to unclear legal and policy guidelines 
about legal abortions, even women who 
may qualify for legal abortions in Ireland 
cannot obtain them for fear of severe pen-
alties, which may include penal servitude 
for life for both women undergoing and 
doctors performing abortions. As a result, 
some doctors are reluctant to provide pre-
natal screening for severe fetal abnormali-
ties, and very few women have access to 
domestic legal abortions.
The international legal community has 
taken notice. Last year, the UN Human 
Rights Committee criticized Ireland’s laws 
on abortion during the country’s Universal 
Periodic Review and recommended that 
the country harmonize its domestic litiga-
tion with the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On 
December 9, 2009, the Grand Chamber 
of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) heard ABC v. Ireland, the first 
case in the ECtHR to challenge Ireland’s 
anti-abortion laws in more than fifteen 
years. The case involves three women who 
are challenging the ban on grounds that 
it forces women to travel abroad to pro-
cure abortions, jeopardizing their health 
and well-being in violation of their rights 
under the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). The specific ECHR pro-
visions cited are Article 2 (right to life); 
Article 3 (prohibition of torture); Article 8 
(right to respect for family and private life); 
and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimina-
tion). Pro-choice advocacy groups argue 
that ABC v. Ireland has a better chance for 
success than its predecessor, D v. Ireland, 
because it directly challenges Ireland’s 
general prohibition on abortion rather than 
make an inroad through a particular excep-
tion. In D v. Ireland, a pregnant woman 
challenged the lack of abortion services in 
Ireland in the case of a lethal fetal abnor-
mality.
This case has significant consequences 
for both Ireland and the entire European 
community. As suggested by Johanna 
Higgins, co-founder of the Association of 
Catholic Lawyers of Ireland, a ruling in 
favor of the three women might signal to 
EU Member States that they are no longer 
free to make certain decisions concerning 
their own domestic law, which is often 
rooted in unique historical, religious, and 
cultural principles.
JuDge BaltasaR gaRzón faces 
cRiminal cHaRges fOR pROBing intO 
tHe fate Of spain’s DisappeaReD
Nearly thirty years after the end of the 
Francisco Franco regime, a lawyer visited 
ninety-year-old Teofila Gonzalez at her 
retirement home in 2008 and told her 
that one of the eleven bodies found in the 
exhumation of a mass grave, ordered by 
Judge Baltasar Garzón, was identified as 
her brother, Severiano. Severiano had been 
a left-wing Republican who was captured, 
held at the village church, and then dragged 
away in a cart, never to be seen again.
Garzón is currently under criminal 
investigation by Audiencia Nacional, 
Spain’s highest criminal court, for breach-
ing his duties as a judge and launch-
ing an inquiry on October 16, 2008 into 
22 alleged cases of illegal detention and 
forced disappearances, involving more 
than 100,000 victims, committed during 
the country’s civil war (1936-1939) and 
General Franco’s dictatorship (1939-1975).
In October 2008, Garzón ordered the 
exhumation of mass graves in response 
to a petition filed by thirteen associa-
tions of the victims’ families. For the first 
time in Spanish history, someone was 
attempting to establish accountability for 
the killings of thousands of left-wingers, 
union members, and other opponents of 
the regime who were disappeared over 
seventy years earlier. Aside from political 
opposition by the Popular Party and the 
Catholic Church, Garzón faced several 
legal obstacles, including a 1977 amnesty 
law that granted immunity for all political 
crimes committed prior to December 1976 
as part of a national reconciliation pro-
gram. In a 68-page report presented to the 
court, Garzón alleged that the illegal deten-
tion and disappearance of victims are not 
subject to the 1977 amnesty law because 
they can be characterized as crimes against 
humanity, therefore subject to universal 
jurisdiction. Garzón also rejected any stat-
ute of limitations, reasoning that the crimes 
are ongoing since Franco waged a sys-
tematic campaign to eliminate opponents 
and hide their bodies, and the bodies are 
still missing. Contrary to the Prosecutor’s 
objections, a Law on Historical Memory, 
passed in 2007 to bar victims’ potential 
legal claims, does not prevent investiga-
tions on crimes against humanity.
According to Amnesty International, 
blocking Garzón’s war crimes investiga-
tions would violate Spain’s obligations 
under international law. A country’s 
refusal to acknowledge the detention or 
whereabouts of victims of persecution 
is an enforced disappearance and a vio-
lation of the 2006 Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (Convention against 
Enforced Disappearance), passed by the 
UN General Assembly and ratified by 
Spain in 2009. This convention has not 
yet entered into force. The ICCPR, which 
Spain ratified in 1977, obligates govern-
ments “to ensure that any person whose 
rights or freedoms . . . are violated shall 
have an effective remedy.” In addition, 
Garzón urged the court to apply ex post 
facto law (law created after the fact), spe-
cifically Article 5 of the Convention against 
Enforced Disappearance, as had been done 
during the Nuremberg trials. Most recently, 
the ECtHR held in 2009 that an amnesty 
law contradicts a state’s duty to investigate 
acts of torture or barbarity. It is ironic that 
the Spanish government and especially 
the Prosecutor’s Office are challenging 
Garzón’s efforts, since they extended their 
support when Garzón issued an indictment 
against Chilean General Augusto Pinochet 
for the murder and torture of thousands and 
when he led Mexico to extradite Ricardo 
Miguel Cavallo, a former military official 
from Argentina implicated in atrocities 
during the country’s military dictatorship.
Annamaria Racota, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers Europe for the Human 
Rights Brief.
south aNd ceNtral asia
taJikistan: feaRs Of Refugee influx 
may leaD tO legal RefORm
Since 2001, Tajikistan has seen an 
influx of refugees over its southern bor-
der with Afghanistan. Amid new NATO 
offensives and resurgent Taliban forces, it 
is feared that the number of refugees from 
Afghanistan may become unmanageable.
The number of Afghan refugees in 
Tajikistan has tripled since 2008, with a 
reported 100 to 200 refugees entering the 
country every month. According to the 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), 5,000 Afghan refu-
gees are currently residing in Tajikistan. 
As NATO and Afghan forces intervene 
in the southern region of Afghanistan, 
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and Taliban forces continue attacks in the 
north, the number of refugees is expected 
to continue to increase, reaching an esti-
mated 7,000 refugees in 2010.
Although there is peace on the 
Tajikistan side of the border, life is con-
tinually difficult for Afghan refugees. 
There are limited services established for 
refugees in Tajikistan, which according 
to International Crisis Group, is on the 
fringe of becoming a failed state ten years 
after its own civil war. UNHCR provides 
refugee households with less than U.S. 
$10 a month; meanwhile, the refugees 
face language barriers, discrimination, 
and massive unemployment. Creating fur-
ther problems, many Tajik citizens see the 
influx of refugees as a threat to an already 
scarce job market. Though the budget for 
UNHCR programs in Central Asia is at its 
highest level in recent years, new influxes 
of refugees will require even greater costs.
Tajikistan has ratified both the 1951 
Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
but has yet to bring its Refugee Status 
Determination (RSD) process and refu-
gee legislation up to international stan-
dards. The imminent influx of refugees has 
facilitated increased collaboration between 
UNHCR and the government of Tajikistan, 
providing UNHCR with a major opportu-
nity to push for reform of refugee policies 
in the region.
In the past, UNHCR has sought to 
train government officials, institutions 
dealing with refugees, and Tajik border 
guards regarding refugee protection; it 
also implemented a resettlement pro-
gram, which ended in 2006. While some 
of these older programs may continue, 
there is a significant need to improve 
documentation provided to refugees. A 
recently established Refugee Department 
under Tajikistan’s Ministry of the Interior 
could facilitate domestic RSD legislation. 
According to the UNHCR 2010 Regional 
Operations Profile for Central Asia, com-
prehensive plans to reduce statelessness 
and to increase integration and resettle-
ment programs are also top priorities. 
There are plans to attempt local integration 
of refugees who have been in Tajikistan for 
longer periods and repatriation of willing 
refugees. Additionally, through assistance 
from NGOs and the Tajikistan government, 
UNHCR hopes to implement programs to 
address children’s education, health care 
needs, and women’s empowerment among 
refugee populations.
Though Tajikistan may be on the brink 
of failure itself, the threat of an immense 
increase in refugees could be the needed 
catalyst for overdue reform of refugee laws 
in the region.
RepORts Of sRi lankan Hit-list stiR 
feaRs Of activist anD JOuRnalist 
peRsecutiOn
In early March 2010, a Sri Lankan 
government document was leaked, which 
as reported by Amnesty International, con-
tained a list of 35 of the foremost journal-
ists and NGO officers who were under sur-
veillance by the Sri Lankan secret service. 
Each name was followed by a grade, denot-
ing those with the highest significance to 
the secret service.
Amnesty International fears for the 
safety of the activists named on the list. 
Ranking at the top of the list and of 
chief concern to Amnesty International 
are Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, 
Executive Director of the Center for Policy 
Alternatives (CPA), and J.C. Weliamuna, 
Director of Transparency International 
Sri Lanka (TISL). Both CPA and TISL 
monitored the January 2010 presidential 
elections in Sri Lanka, and both reported 
on the misuse of resources and electoral 
violations.
When news of the list reached the two 
executive directors in March 2010, they 
wrote a joint letter to President Mahinda 
Rajapaksa, protesting the list’s necessity. 
The activists were not completely caught 
off guard, however, as both have endured 
numerous threats to their safety in the two 
years prior. In September 2008, a grenade 
was launched at Weliamuna’s property, 
but no one was injured; the investigation 
that followed the incident was inadequate. 
More recently, in February 2010, a Sri 
Lankan newspaper reported that President 
Rajapaksa stated “something must be 
done” about Weliamuna during a meeting 
with Freedom Party lawyers. Likewise, in 
August 2009, Saravanamuttu received an 
anonymous death threat, which was not 
investigated.
Amnesty International has also voiced 
concern for 56 Sri Lankan journalists who 
are thought to face threats. According to 
Amnesty International, since 2006, jour-
nalists have been killed, detained, tor-
tured, and forced to leave the country after 
receiving death threats. None of the allega-
tions have been thoroughly investigated.
The “hit-list” is the latest in a wave of 
anti-journalist and -activist actions by the 
government since the January 2010 elec-
tions. An ongoing media campaign strives 
to discredit NGOs with claims that the orga-
nizations are attempting to undermine Sri 
Lankan democracy. The government stated 
that it has begun investigating and is seek-
ing to take legal action against NGOs. 
Additionally, four reporters who were in hid-
ing since the January elections were arrested 
in early March by the Terrorism Investigation 
Division, due to their connection to opposi-
tion leader General Sarath Fonseka.
After allegations of the hit-list became 
public, Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch, Transparency International, 
the Asian Human Rights Commission, the 
International Federation of Journalists, 
the Asian Legal Resource Center, and 
Reporters without Borders all called 
for a halt of the persecution of journal-
ists, NGOs, and activists in Sri Lanka. 
Transparency International has asked 
the government to ensure the safety of 
Transparency International staff and reaf-
firm freedom of expression. In a letter 
to President Rajapaksa, the International 
Federation of Journalists expressed its con-
cern over the list’s purpose and called for 
protection of those listed.
Despite the outcry from international 
and Sri Lankan organizations over the hit-
list, the Sri Lankan government denies, and 
some media outlets remain unconvinced 
of, its existence. The government accused 
Amnesty International of bias, challenging 
the organization to prove the document’s 
existence. News of the list reportedly 
appeared on a Sri Lankan website, Lanka 
News Web, whose editor was also named. 
According to the International Federation 
of Journalists, the list is also being held 
by diplomatic missions in Sri Lanka, giv-
ing the list’s existence more credibility. 
Nevertheless, the Sri Lankan government 
assured civil society and its critics that 
there was no reason to fear for their physi-
cal safety.
If these allegations are confirmed, 
they may further tarnish the Sri Lankan 
government’s reputation as a democracy. 
The United Nations Convention against 
Corruption obligates States Parties to pro-
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mote NGO and civil society involvement in 
raising public awareness of governmental 
corruption. Threats to the safety of activ-
ists and journalists severely undermine 
this goal. Sri Lanka has signed and ratified 
the Convention, which entered into force 
in March 2004. The continuing state of 
emergency in Sri Lanka, declared after the 
defeat of the Tamil Tigers in May 2009, 
assists the government by providing it with 
an excuse to ignore its international obliga-
tions and continue the trend of silencing 
those who speak out.
BanglaDesHi WaR cRimes tRiBunal in 
tHe WORks
In March 2010, almost forty years after 
the 1971 fight for independence from 
Pakistan, the Bangladeshi government cre-
ated a war crimes tribunal to prosecute 
those who committed atrocities during the 
bloody nine-month conflict. The govern-
ment estimates three million people were 
killed during the war by Pakistani soldiers 
and Bangladeshi collaborators. An esti-
mated 200,000 women were raped, and the 
numbers of displaced persons reached the 
millions.
According to the Law Minister of 
Bangladesh, Shafique Ahmed, the govern-
ment named three high court judges, led by 
Justice Nizamul Haque Nasim, to carry out 
trials for rape, murder, arson, torture, and 
genocide. A panel of retired Bangladeshi 
officials and lawyers will be prosecuting 
those suspected of forming auxiliary forces 
to aid Pakistan in 1971.
The Law Ministry stated that the tribu-
nal will be conducted according to a 1973 
act that sets guidelines for the prosecution 
of those accused of breaking international 
law and committing crimes against human-
ity. The government has prohibited fifty 
suspects from leaving the country, most of 
whom are members of Jamaat-e-Islami, 
the largest Islamic party in Bangladesh, 
which sided with Pakistan during the war. 
Allegedly, members of the party identified 
victims for the Pakistani military and may 
have assisted in killings. An estimated 
1,600 people took part in the atrocities, but 
those who were members of the Pakistani 
army will not be subject to the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction. The government has provided 
no explanation for this decision, bringing 
criticism that the proceedings are victor’s 
justice and the tribunal is a vehicle to 
persecute political opposition. After the 
war, collaborators who were not direct 
perpetrators of heinous crimes were given 
amnesty and will not be prosecuted in the 
tribunal. Those with evidence or charges 
against them for direct participation were 
not given amnesty.
The creation of the tribunal is prom-
ising, though the undertaking has been 
delayed since Bangladesh gained indepen-
dence. Sheik Mujibur Rahman, founder 
and leader of Bangladesh, began trials 
of war criminals in 1973, but was assas-
sinated before they could be completed. 
Since then, political turmoil has hindered 
the progress of the tribunal despite outcries 
from victims’ families and veterans of the 
war. The current Prime Minister, Sheik 
Hasina, campaigned to prosecute war crim-
inals, and Parliament passed a resolution 
for swift trials in 2009, finally allowing for 
the creation of the tribunal.
The renewed promise became action two 
days after Bangladesh’s ratification of the 
Rome Statute for the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), which defines the crime of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes. Bangladesh is the 111th nation in the 
world, but the first in South Asia, to become 
a State Party to the ICC. Bangladesh may 
now need to reexamine the implementation 
of its tribunal to ensure consistency with 
the standards set forth in the Rome Statute, 
which will enter into force June 2010. In 
one notable example, the 1973 act creat-
ing the Bangladesh Tribunal allows for the 
death penalty, a punishment that is not per-
mitted under the Rome Statute. Though the 
time lapse since the war may make it more 
difficult to produce evidence and fair trials, 
the United Nations has expressed its hope 
that the trials operate according to interna-
tional standards for which it is considering 
sending observers.
Bhavani Raveendran, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, covers South and Central 
Asia for the Human Rights Brief.
east asia
mOngOlia: extReme cOlD Resulting 
in malnutRitiOn anD Risk Of Disease
Recently, the United Nations Children’s 
Fund, with the cooperation of the govern-
ment of Mongolia, airlifted essential emer-
gency supplies to children living in rural 
areas of Mongolia severely hit by extreme 
cold. Supplies included blankets, warm 
clothing, fuel for heating and cooking, and 
hygiene kits. Due to weeks of heavy snow-
fall, sixty percent of Mongolia was covered 
by between eight to sixteen inches of snow, 
with temperatures as low as negative fifty 
degrees Celsius. At least six million live-
stock died of starvation, threatening the 
lives of nomadic herders — third of the 
population of Mongolia — who rely heav-
ily on agriculture and herding.
With average winter temperatures 
reaching as low as negative thirty degrees 
Celsius, Mongolians are accustomed to 
cold weather, however, this winter was the 
harshest in thirty years. The government of 
Mongolia declared a disaster in more than 
half of the country’s 21 provinces, which 
are in urgent need of humanitarian assis-
tance. Mongolians call the harsh weather a 
dzud, Mongolian for a severe winter with 
heavy snow, strong winds, and extremely 
low temperatures, preceded by a summer 
drought. A dzud typically results in live-
stock deaths, because the prolonged dry 
summer leaves insufficient feed for the fol-
lowing winter, and the extreme cold hard-
ens the snow and ice, impeding grazing.
The fierce winter and loss of livestock 
threatens herder families with serious food 
shortages and poverty. Isolated by snow, 
villagers do not have access to food, medi-
cal care, or other emergency services, and 
at least eleven people, including nine chil-
dren, have been reported dead. Since herd-
ing and agriculture are the backbone of 
the rural economy in Mongolia, livestock 
deaths means loss of income for many. 
In addition to food shortages, potential 
spread of disease caused by rotting animal 
carcasses is a growing problem. The risk of 
illness, including anthrax and salmonella 
infection, is anticipated to rise once the 
snow begins to melt.
Another possible effect of the extreme 
weather is overpopulation of Mongolian 
cities. After previous dzuds, many nomads 
abandoned the grassland and moved to 
capital, Ulaanbaatar, to seek jobs. Many 
are forced to live in shantytowns without 
access to water and heat because the cities 
cannot support the influx.
In order to alleviate the consequences 
of this dzud, international organizations and 
NGOs have responded with humanitarian 
assistance. The United Nations Population 
Fund furnished medical and hygiene equip-
ment to 6,000 pregnant mothers who were 
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unable to go to health facilities. Moreover, 
in order to prevent soil contamination and 
the outbreak of disease, the United Nations 
Development Program adopted a cash-for-
work program to pay about 60,000 herders to 
collect and bury the carcasses of the dead live-
stock. The program is an effective approach 
since it produces income for nomads who 
have lost their livestock and reduces health 
risks to public at the same time.
While emergency needs are being 
addressed, Mongolia’s heavy reliance on 
livestock herding has become controver-
sial. To prevent future losses of livestock, 
experts urge Mongolia to restrict the use of 
grasslands, as overgrazing has depleted the 
useable pasture with the number of herds 
increasing by half over the last twenty 
years. Though the current focus should be 
on humanitarian assistance, the govern-
ment of Mongolia should also address the 
long-term effects of the extreme weather 
disaster and adopt policies to support the 
nomadic herders.
sHOulD a cRiminal suspect’s face 
Be RevealeD? tHe cuRRent DeBate in 
sOutH kORea
On March 6, 2010, a thirteen-year-old 
girl who had been missing since February 
24, 2010, was found dead in a rooftop water 
tank near her house in Busan, South Korea. 
The naked body was covered with plastic 
bags and calcium carbonate, and showed 
signs of rape before suffocation. Based on 
evidence, including a DNA sample from 
the teenager’s body and a sweater dumped 
near the water tank, police indentified Kim 
Kil-tae as the main suspect. After hiding 
successfully for fifteen days after the girl’s 
disappearance, Kim was arrested four days 
after the body was discovered. Charged 
with rape and murder, Kim initially denied 
all charges against him, but ultimately con-
fessed to involvement in the crime.
In response to subsequent public out-
rage, police took unprecedented action and 
revealed Kim’s face when he was taken 
to the police station following his arrest. 
Korean law and National Police Agency 
guidelines require that police protect crimi-
nal suspects’ privacy by limiting media 
access and refraining from releasing their 
identities during ongoing investigations. 
Under normal arrest procedures, police con-
ceal a suspect’s face with baseball caps and 
masks in public. In other countries, includ-
ing the United States, France, and Japan, it 
is very rare to find such police practices or 
laws that specifically regulate the conduct 
of law enforcement authorities regarding the 
publicity of suspects’ identities.
The controversy over whether to dis-
close the identity of a criminal suspect 
under investigation is not new in South 
Korea. In 2009, when police arrested serial 
killer Kang Ho-soon, the media exposed 
his face, claiming the people had a right 
to know his identity. The media and some 
members of the public argue that full dis-
closure of a criminal suspect’s identity, 
especially when there is a strong evidence 
of guilt, ensures public safety and deters 
crime. Opponents, relying on the principle 
that suspects are innocent until proven 
guilty, stress that exposing the identity of 
a criminal suspect violates basic human 
rights. They also argue that such exposure 
inflicts emotional distress on the suspect’s 
family members and makes reassimilation 
into society upon release more difficult, 
which in turn contributes to recidivism.
A petition was filed on March 12, 2010, 
to the National Human Rights Commission 
of Korea, alleging police wrongfully 
exposed Kim’s face to the public. However, 
there are indications that official police 
procedure may change in South Korea. 
The governing Grand National Party of 
South Korea moved to amend the law 
last year, adding a Release of Identities 
Exception Provision to the Special Act 
on Punishment of Violent Crimes. The 
provision would allow disclosure of the 
name, age, and face of criminal suspects 
charged with serious crimes, such as mur-
der, rape, or kidnapping, if police obtained 
a confession or strong evidence of guilt. 
The provision passed the Cabinet last July, 
but is currently pending at the Legislation 
and Judiciary Committee of the National 
Assembly.
Different standards should apply for 
those suspected of heinous crimes because 
the safety of society is at higher risk. 
Although there is no current rule classi-
fying “heinous crimes,” a consistent and 
clear standard could provide guidelines 
to law enforcement authorities to pro-
tect both societal interests and individual 
rights. Because of the high likelihood of 
a conviction, when police have obtained a 
confession or have strong evidence of guilt, 
serving the public interest becomes more 
important than preventing the possible 
negative consequences of disclosure.
zeRO upR RecOmmenDatiOns 
accepteD By nORtH kORea
One of the duties of the UN Human 
Rights Council, established by UN General 
Assembly Resolution 60/251 in 2006, 
is to review human rights conditions of 
each UN Member State. Composed of 
47 elected representatives from Member 
States, the Universal Periodic Review 
(UPR) Working Group reviews each state’s 
human rights record and makes recom-
mendations as to actions it should take to 
improve human rights conditions. In addi-
tion to the Working Group, any Member 
State can participate during the interactive 
dialogue with the states under review. Each 
Member State is reviewed once every four 
years; by 2011, all 192 Members will have 
completed a UPR.
North Korea is a State Party to major 
international human rights instruments: 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR); the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR); the Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW); and the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC). North Korea 
underwent its first UPR in December 2009, 
attracting special interests from the inter-
national community.
North Korea filed its National Report, 
which explained the state’s basic positions 
on human rights, described its institutions 
and laws promoting human rights, and 
illustrated current obstacles in protect-
ing its citizens’ rights. The Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) filed a compilation of recom-
mendations from other UN committees and 
offices and the Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights in North Korea 
NGOs, including Human Rights Watch, 
Amnesty International, and the Asia 
Centre for Human Rights, reported human 
rights violations in North Korea through 
the OHCHR Summary of stakeholders’ 
information.
During the country’s review on December 
7, 2009, Ri Tcheul, the Ambassador of 
North Korea to the United Nations, and 
twelve members of the North Korean del-
egation engaged in discussions with 52 
countries. Member States expressed grave 
concerns about North Korean political 
prison camps, the use of torture, public 
executions, and forced labor. The participant 
countries also listed 117 recommendations 
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for North Korea. They advised North Korea 
to take measures to fully comply with inter-
national human rights instruments to which 
it is a State Party, including the ICCPR, 
the ICESCR, the CEDAW, and the CRC, 
which together demand respect for the rights 
of freedom of expression, association and 
movement, and ensuring that its citizens 
have adequate access to food.
Two days after the review, however, 
Ri Tcheul announced that North Korea 
rejected fifty of the recommendations 
outright, and that it would soon exam-
ine the others. At the closing session of 
North Korea’s UPR on March 18, 2010, Ri 
Tcheul, without providing any additional 
explanation, reaffirmed North Korea’s pre-
vious statement that it rejected fifty of the 
proposals.
UN Member States, including South 
Korea, the United States, Japan, and 
France, expressed their disappointment 
about North Korea’s vague response and 
failure to elaborate on which recommenda-
tions it would accept or reject. Although 
some countries considered North Korea’s 
participation in the UPR an important 
indication of its willingness to discuss and 
review human rights issues, the signifi-
cance of the review is meaningless if North 
Korea disregards the recommendations.
North Korea is obligated to respect, 
protect, and fulfill the rights enumerated in 
the treaties to which the country is a State 
Party. Unfortunately, there is no direct 
enforcement mechanism to compel North 
Korea to comply with these obligations; 
however, the UPR process is politically 
influential. If North Korea does not sin-
cerely consider the Member States’ recom-
mendations, it will jeopardize the country’s 
position on the international stage and 
bring increased scrutiny and criticism for 
lack of commitment to international col-
laboration. The importance of international 
political pressure for the enforcement of 
human rights underscores that the UN 
Member States and international organiza-
tions must not give up on North Korea. 
Until North Korea’s second UPR in 2013, 
they should continue to pressure one of the 
world’s most defiant countries to comply 
with its treaty obligations and improve 
human rights.
Ri Yoo, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, cov-
ers East Asia for the Human Rights Brief.
southeast asia aNd oceaNia
sOliDaRity tHROugH fOOD
In response to a recent spike in racially 
motivated attacks against Indian students 
in Australia, one citizen has taken it upon 
herself to show support for the Indian com-
munity in her city. Mia Northrop, a digital 
media designer and resident of Melbourne, 
created an event called Vindaloo Against 
Violence and advertised it through 
Facebook, a social networking website. The 
concept behind Northrop’s campaign was 
simple. Participants should eat out at, or 
order in from, Indian restaurants through-
out Melbourne. According to the Vindaloo 
Against Violence website, the event would 
allow Melbournians to “express their anger 
and disappointment that racially motivated 
violence is occurring in their city, embrace 
and show solidarity with the local Indian 
community, [and] mount a show of force 
against the perpetrators of violence.”
 Over the last year, tensions have risen 
both between Australia and India, and 
between Australian and Indian communi-
ties within Australia, over racially moti-
vated attacks against Indian students. The 
first of these highly publicized attacks 
occurred in May 2009 when a 25-year-old 
Indian student was repeatedly stabbed in 
the head with a screwdriver at a birth-
day party in Melbourne. Some authori-
ties in Australia claim that the attacks 
occur because the perpetrators see Indian 
students as “soft targets.” The Australian 
government, in an attempt to improve its 
image and assure potential students that the 
country is safe, has created a taskforce to 
look into accusations of racially motivated 
violence and inadequate police response. 
Tensions, however, remain high, as many 
Indian student leaders say certain issues 
still need to be resolved.
Vindaloo Against Violence started 
with only 100 registered supporters. On 
February 24, 2010, however, over 17,000 
Australians participated in the event, eat-
ing at over 400 Indian restaurants. Many 
Melbourne police officers and politicians 
dined out in support of the movement, 
and local parliaments across Australia 
served Indian foods in their cafeterias. 
People in Tokyo, New York, Amsterdam, 
and Stockholm also connected through 
Facebook and hosted their own events in 
solidarity with Australians.
Many Indian newspapers, including the 
Bangalore Mirror and the Times of India, 
covered the event in a positive light, a dra-
matic change from the consistently negative 
coverage of the attacks and accusations of 
racism previously appearing in such papers. 
According to John Brumby, Premier of 
Victoria, the province in which Melbourne 
is located, the “Vindaloo Against Violence 
initiative is a unique opportunity for 
Victorian[s] to unite and send a message 
that the actions of an ignorant few will not 
be allowed to undermine the reputation of 
Melbourne as a peaceful and friendly city.” 
Brumby himself participated in the cam-
paign by dining at a local Indian restaurant 
with several Indian students.
Social media sites like Facebook are 
playing a growing role in human rights 
activism by helping to organize grassroots 
action and educate a global audience about 
human rights abuses. These sites make it 
relatively easy to publicize issues, organize 
activism events, and gather and publish evi-
dence of abuses. For example in February 
2008, a Colombian engineer and five of his 
friends started a Facebook group called “No 
More FARC,” in protest of the practices and 
tactics of the Colombian guerilla movement. 
The group, now called “A Million Voices 
Against FARC,” has over 430,000 members. 
The group’s members organized a protest in 
early 2008, which quickly spread to millions 
of protesters in 140 cities worldwide. Social 
media also played a critical role in the pro-
tests following the 2009 presidential elec-
tions in Iran, many of which were coordi-
nated in part through Facebook and Twitter, 
the microblogging service. Videos of the 
protest were also uploaded to YouTube, 
where they have been viewed by millions of 
people worldwide.
tRutH anD RecOnciliatiOn in tHe 
sOlOmOn islanDs
The Solomon Islands Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission (TRC) launched its 
first public hearings on March 10, marking 
an important step forward in the national 
quest for reconciliation following the five-
year ethnic conflict that ended in 2003. 
Nineteen victims testified over two days, 
publicly recounting experiences they have 
rarely spoken about, even in private. One 
woman, Edith Padavisu, told of an attack on 
her husband in Guadalcanal in April 1999. 
She described how militants used bush 
knives, spears and guns in their assault, after 
which they left her husband to die.
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Ethnic tensions on Guadalcanal, the 
largest of the Solomon Islands, have roots 
back to independence in 1978. Guadalcanal 
natives believed ethnic Malaita settlers from 
other islands had acquired a disproportion-
ate amount of jobs and land on Guadalcanal. 
These tensions escalated to violence in 
December 1998, when the Guadalcanal 
Revolutionary Army (also known as the 
Istambu Freedom Fighters) began a cam-
paign to force Malaitan settlers to leave 
Guadalcanal. Malaitans formed their own 
competing militia, the Malaita Eagle Force. 
Fighting continued until 2003, when a 
regional coalition of troops from Australia 
and other Pacific islands arrived to restore 
stability. During the conflict, more than 100 
people were killed and 20,000 displaced. 
Many others suffered various human rights 
abuses, including torture.
Although the armed conflict has ended, 
the Solomon Islands continue to experience 
political instability and ethnic tensions, due 
in large part to unaddressed issues and 
unanswered questions. The current Prime 
Minister Derek Sikua, who took office in 
2007, made reconciliation an official top 
priority. This included the establishment, in 
2008, of the TRC, tasked with investigating 
the causes of the conflict and the nature and 
extent of human rights abuses during that 
period; evaluating the impact of the conflict 
on the educational, health and other sectors; 
and making recommendations on how to 
prevent future conflict.
Borrowing from the South African 
model, the TRC is composed of five mem-
bers, three nationals and two non-nationals, 
who lead public hearings in which victims, 
witnesses, and perpetrators can testify. 
The TRC was officially launched in April 
2009, with an appearance by Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu. Over the next year, the 
TRC held workshops around the country 
to inform citizens about its work and the 
opportunities available to them. The TRC 
plans to hold seven more hearings this year, 
the next on the island of Malaita. Many 
witnesses have already volunteered to tes-
tify at future hearings.
 One crucial component has been 
absent from the hearings: testimony from 
the perpetrators. Witnesses and victims 
have called for the perpetrators to testify, 
so that the whole community can benefit 
from the TRC and begin to move forward. 
Selwyn Kei, a victim testifying before the 
TRC, asked for the chance to forgive his 
perpetrators. He said, “I am asking you, my 
perpetrators, to come forward to reconcile 
with me. Together we can carry our nation 
forward.” Father Samual Ata, the Chair of 
the TRC, supported these calls for perpe-
trators to step forward, not for judgment 
but for reconciliation, pronouncing “We 
definitely encourage them to testify. It is 
very important, because the perpetrators do 
also need healing.”
inDigenOus malaysians insist On 
enfORcement Of custOmaRy lanD 
RigHts
More than 1,000 indigenous Orang Asli 
people gathered in Putrajaya, Malaysia 
on March 17 to protest a land bill, which, 
under the guise of granting land, refuses to 
adhere to judicially recognized indigenous 
land rights and severely limits the amount 
of Orang Asli land. Elders of the three 
main Orang Asli communities led mem-
bers of various tribes in what the Center 
for Orang Asli Concerns claims to have 
been the largest gathering of Orang Asli 
in history. Although the elders planned for 
the protest to lead to the Prime Minister’s 
offices, police diverted most to the Rural 
and Regional Development Ministry, 
where the leaders submitted a memoran-
dum explaining their complaints against 
the land bill. After receiving the memoran-
dum, the Rural and Regional Development 
Minister assured those gathered that the 
government would look into their com-
plaints and attempt to reconcile them with 
the proposed bill.
Orang Asli is the name given to all 
eighteen non-Malay indigenous tribes on 
the Malay Peninsula, which total around 
150,000 people. Orang Asli land rights are 
governed by the Aboriginal People’s Act of 
1954. Under this Act, the state may declare 
an area customarily and currently inhab-
ited by Orang Asli to be an “aboriginal 
area.” Orang Asli have exclusive rights of 
occupancy of this customary land and use 
of its natural resources, but have no rights 
of ownership. They cannot sell, lease, or 
grant this land without permission from the 
Commissioner of Aboriginal Affairs, a post 
which has never been held by an Orang 
Asli. The government may take the land at 
any time, and must only pay compensation 
for the value of the crops and dwelling on 
the land, not the land itself.
Nevertheless, in the 2002 case Sagong 
bin Tasi v. Selangor State Government, the 
Malaysian High Court declared that the 
Orang Asli have a proprietary interest in 
their customary lands, including the right 
to use and derive profit from the land. The 
Court further declared that Orang Asli land 
fell under the Land Acquisition Act, which 
governs all land acquisition in Malaysia, 
and that the government taking of the land 
required compensation in the same man-
ner as non-Orang Asli land. The Court of 
Appeal affirmed the decision.
The proposed bill, which the Orang Asli 
oppose, is an amendment to the Aboriginal 
People’s Act. The amendment would offer 
each Orang Asli family two to six acres of 
land, but once they accept that land, they 
lose all future claims to any other custom-
ary land. Furthermore, the amendment 
would limit the total Orang Asli land to 
fifty thousand hectares, an amount sub-
stantially less than the 129,000 hectares 
they claim. Orang Asli groups assert that 
the amendment also imposes conditions on 
the land, such as prohibiting rental without 
state permission and mandating that the 
planting of certain crops be managed by 
private developers.
Many civil society groups, includ-
ing the Malaysian Bar Association, have 
strongly supported Orang Asli rights. The 
Bar Association issued a press release urg-
ing the government to “formally recognise, 
protect and guarantee [Orang Asli] rights 
to all their ancestral lands,” and to with-
draw any proposed legislation that would 
limit these rights. Commentators also insist 
that the government uphold its commit-
ments under the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which states 
that indigenous peoples have “the right to 
the lands, territories and resources which 
they have traditionally owned, occupied or 
otherwise used or acquired.”
 The Malaysian government must move 
forward in the area of indigenous rights, and 
live up to international standards if it wishes 
to gain the respect of the international com-
munity. The government must fulfill its 
obligations under its domestic legal system, 
as decided by the High Court in Sagong bin 
Tasi, and not attempt to appease the Orang 
Asli community by granting them, with sig-
nificant conditions, part of the land that they 
already own in full.
Aileen Thomson, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College of 
Law, covers the Southeast Asia and Oceania 
column for the Human Rights Brief. HRB
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